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We examine the causal effects of the energy subsidy programme 
PetroCaribe in the three dimensions of sustainable development: eco-
nomic, social and environmental. We use the synthetic control method to 
construct a counterfactual and compare it to the outcomes of the benefi-
ciary countries and thus estimate the magnitude and direction of the 
PetroCaribe effect. PetroCaribe had a positive effect on economic growth 
in most of the beneficiary countries; however, this economic boost was 
not followed by an improvement in social development. Environmentally, 
PetroCaribe did not negatively or positively impact the environmental 
quality of the member countries, in the sense that we do not find a signifi-
cant effect on the trend of CO2 emissions per capita.
1 IntroductIon
The PetroCaribe programme, initiated by the late President Chavez of 
Venezuela, sold oil below market price to political allies. This paper is 
the first to study the implications for the beneficiaries on their economic 
growth, energy use, and societies.
Oil prices exhibited unprecedented volatility at the beginning of the 
2000s, with an upward trend during 2003-2008. Prices rose from US$30 in 
2003 to a historic high of US$147 in 2008. Overall, the extent of the adverse 
effects of high and volatile oil prices depend on whether a country is an oil 
exporter or importer, its level of development and on the governmental ca-
pability to face oil shocks (Monaldi, 2015; Yépez-García and Dana, 2012). 
In particular, in oil importing countries that are highly reliant on oil for 
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power generation, the steep rise in the world oil price posed challenges to 
the government, which had to take action through a variety of policy inter-
ventions to mitigate the negative effects to their macroeconomic variables, 
such as subsidies.1
In Latin America and the Caribbean, specifically in Central America 
and the Caribbean region, all countries except for Trinidad and Tobago and 
Guatemala are net oil importers and nearly 81 percent of their electricity 
supply comes from oil products, which makes the region highly vulnerable 
to oil price fluctuations.
Amid the peak of high oil prices in mid-2000, Venezuela, together 
with several countries in Central America and the Caribbean, founded the 
PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement. Initially signed by 14 coun-
tries in June 2005, PetroCaribe currently has 19 members. The agreement 
provides a financial subsidy that allows its members to buy Venezuelan oil 
and oil products at concessionary prices, or to exchange it for goods and 
services not produced in Venezuela. The stated main objective of the agree-
ment is to contribute to the energy security, socioeconomic development 
and the integration of the Caribbean countries through the sovereign use of 
their energy resources. Along with supply, PetroCaribe also aims to finance 
energy infrastructure and development of indigenous, alternative energy 
sources. The IMF estimates the size of the PetroCaribe subsidy at least 0.7 
per cent of GDP of the beneficiaries on average in 2015 (McIntyre et al., 
2016). The savings derived from the oil bill are used at the beneficiaries’ free 
will. Some countries have used part of the funds to locally subsidize energy 
and transport (Di Bella et al., 2015; ECCB, 2015; Niel et al., 2014). This and 
other types of energy subsidies are a common response of governments to 
cope with high fuel prices. Its use has been linked to supporting energy se-
curity, domestic energy production and affordable access to energy, which 
are expected to have wider positive effects on economic and social develop-
ment (Bacon and Kojima, 2006; Whitley and Van Der Burg, 2015).
Yet, regardless of intentions, in recent years fossil fuel subsidies, includ-
ing those by PetroCaribe, have been put under scrutiny. When the full eco-
nomic, social and environmental costs and benefits of fossil fuel subsidies 
are taken into account, their net costs have often been found to outweigh 
the benefits of sustaining them (UNEP, 2008; Whitley and Van Der Burg, 
2015). It is argued that subsidies can inhibit economic development, drain 
public finances and reduce funds available for addressing social and devel-
opment objectives. From an environmental perspective, subsidies increase 
the consumption of fossil fuels, thus exacerbating their negative effects on 
the environment by increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, energy 
subsidies impose barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency measures and 
1We adopt the OECD definition of energy subsidy as ‘any measure that keeps prices for con-
sumers below market levels, or for producers above market levels or that reduces costs 
for consumers or producers’ (OECD, 2005, p. 114).
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renewable sources of energy (Bridle and Kitson, 2014; UNEP, 2008). Their 
implication for sustainable development and climate change has led to calls 
for phasing out those subsidies from international organizations, such as 
the G20 in 2009, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 2010 and the 
United Nations’ Rio+20 Summit in 2012 (Oosterhuis and Umpfenbach, 
2014). International organizations, such as the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (Burniaux and Chateau, 2014), the 
International Monetary Fund (Coady et al., 2015), and the International 
Energy Agency IEA (2015a) have substantiated the rationale of these calls 
for a phase-out by research.
Studies on the estimated scale of fossil fuel subsidies are traditionally 
measured using a price-gap approach, based on the differential between 
the end user price of fossil fuel and a reference price, e.g. international 
fuel prices. However, most of the times, the data used to construct such 
estimates is lacking, and therefore has to be estimated. Moreover, the 
method cannot capture government interventions that support industries 
or individuals but do not affect the final price of the good (Stefanski, 
2016). Other economic models that have been used are simple models of 
fuel demand (IEA, 2015b) or more advanced CGE models (e.g. Acar and 
Yeldan, 2016; Lin and Ouyang, 2014). Therefore, the estimated effects of 
fuel subsidies on the economy, the environment, and indicators of so-
cial development, have been modeled and are, strictly speaking, not esti-
mated on the basis of observable data. This is a weak basis for estimating 
the impact of subsidies.
In contrast, to overcome the aforementioned lack of appropriate es-
timation methods, in this paper, we propose to estimate the effect of an 
energy subsidy within an impact evaluation approach. In order to do so, we 
apply the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Abadie et al., 2010), a data-driven method that construct a synthetic country 
as a weighted combination of weighted control countries.
Since energy has a critical role in economic and social development, 
energy subsidies need to be analyzed in the context of sustainability (OPEC, 
2010). In this sense, PetroCaribe offers an interesting setting to analyze a 
certain type of energy subsidy, since its objectives are easily identified with 
the so-called three pillars of sustainable development—economic, social 
and environmental. Therefore in this research, we empirically analyze the 
effect of PetroCaribe on the following outcomes: economic development, 
represented by GDP per capita; social development, represented by the 
Human Development Index; and the environment, represented by per cap-
ita CO2 emissions along with electricity use.
This paper fills a methodological gap in the energy subsidies literature 
and sheds light on the causal effects of PetroCaribe’s subsidies on sustain-
able development. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
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applies an impact evaluation technique for the analysis of energy subsidies, 
as well as for the analysis of PetroCaribe.
With the SCM, we are able to estimate what would have been the evo-
lution of our outcomes of interest if countries had not joined PetroCaribe. 
Our main results suggest that PetroCaribe does not represent a contradic-
tion with the discourse of sustainable development. Overall, PetroCaribe 
members experienced an improvement in economic development without a 
deterioration of their environment. Although the countries have a growing 
trend in their per capita CO2 emissions, our analysis concludes that this was 
not significantly different from what they would have experienced without 
the intervention. However, the positive results in economic growth were not 
reflected in an improvement of social development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement and the signatory countries. 
Section 3 presents the synthetic control method. Section 4 presents the data 
and specification. The results are described in Section 5, while Section 6 
discusses the findings and concludes.
2 the PetrocarIbe energy cooPeratIon agreement
PetroCaribe is an energy cooperation agreement between Venezuela and 18 
Central America and Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, the 
Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Saint Lucia, Suriname, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El 
Salvador.2 Launched in 2005,3 the agreement provides Venezuelan oil to the 
member countries at highly concessionary terms.
The stated objectives of PetroCaribe go beyond the oil supply. It seeks 
to be a mechanism that ensures that the savings derived from the energy 
2Despite joining PetroCaribe, the Bahamas, Guatemala and St. Lucia did not enter into bilat-
eral agreements.
3The antecedents of PetroCaribe are: The Puerto Ordaz Accord, signed in 1974 between sev-
eral Caribbean countries, Central American countries and Venezuela. The aim of the 
arrangement was to ease the foreign exchange and balance-of-payment problem suffered 
by oil-importing countries as a result of higher oil prices. The financing scheme estab-
lished a reference price of $6 per barrel (December 1973 price of Venezuelan oil) to be 
paid to Venezuela; the difference between this reference price and the current interna-
tional price was deposited in local currency in the importer’s central bank. The agree-
ment expired on December 31, 1980 (Grayson, 1988; Mayobre, 2005). The San Jose 
Accord (The Program for Energy Cooperation with the Countries of Central America 
and the Caribbean) was signed in 1980 by Mexico and Venezuela, under the agreement 
both countries were supposed to supply 160,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil (80,000 
each one) to 11 Central American and Caribbean countries at a discounted price. Since 
its creation, the agreement was renovated until 2007. Finally, The Caracas Energy 
Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2000 was intended to expand the San Jose agreement 
and include Cuba and other small countries of the Antilles, but it did not prosper (Ruiz, 
2010).
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Causal effects of PetroCaribe on sustainable development 5
bill are allocated to economic and social development programs. It also 
contemplates energy-saving programs and the development of alternative 
sources of energy energy (Petrocaribe, 2005; SELA, 2013).
The financing scheme establishes that the signatory countries can 
buy oil from Venezuela at market prices (as a member of the OPEC, 
Venezuela cannot sell below global market prices) but receive financing 
in the form of a soft loan. The percentage of the financed oil bill f luctu-
ates with the international oil prices. When the price is equal to or below 
US$40, up to 30 percent of the bill will be financed by a 15-year loan plus 
two years of grace at 2 per cent interest. When the price of the barrel 
exceeds US$40 and the deferred financing part ranges between 40 to 70 
percent, the payment is extended to 25 years, with two years of grace pe-
riod at 1 per cent interest. The agreement also stipulates that part of the 
debt can be paid through a trade compensation mechanism, that is, coun-
tries can pay back up to 50 percent of their debt with goods and services. 
To cite some concrete examples of payments by the trade compensation 
mechanism, Guyana signed a rice-for-oil agreement; Nicaragua trades 
diary products, sugar, oil and beans seeds; the Dominican Republic pays 
back the bill with sugar and peas and Jamaica sends clinker to Venezuela 
(Jácome, 2011).
Although Cuba is technically a PetroCaribe member, the energy rela-
tionship between Cuba and Venezuela is handled under the terms a differ-
ent agreement. Cuba and Venezuela signed, in October 2000, the Integral 
Cooperation Agreement (CIC), under which Venezuela supplied at a pref-
erential price (US$27) 53,000 barrels per day. The daily quota increased in 
2005 up to 98mbd, on average receives 72.7 mbd (PDVSA, 2014). Half of 
the oil bill is to be paid within 90 days after the purchase and the rest over 
25 years, with a 2-year grace period, including the cost of transportation 
and insurance. In exchange, Cuba pays back part of its debt with medical 
services, sports trainers, consultants and military advisors (Romero, 2010).
Oil quotas are country-specific, defined in a bilateral market agree-
ment with Petroleos Venezuela (PDVSA). As can be seen in Table 1, no 
country receives the amount of oil agreed.
Although there are other countries that take part in similar bilateral 
agreements (e.g. Jordan signed an agreement in 2008 effective for three years, 
whereby it can buy Iraqi crude at a concessionary price of $22 per barrel. 
Iran agreed to a deferred payment arrangement with Pakistan in which the 
credit facility for payment was extended from 30 to 90 days Kojima, 2009), 
none has been of the duration or scope of PetroCaribe.
The academic literature on the effects of PetroCaribe in its member 
countries is scarce and mostly focused on a political analysis (Jácome, 2011; 
Koivumaeki and Rodrígues, 2014; López and Villani, 2014; Morales Manzur 
et al., 2010). Some authors underline positive results of the Agreement. It 
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has been argued that PetroCaribe has had a significant impact on helping 
member countries deal with the rise in crude oil and food prices. Without 
the subsidy, the rising costs would have meant a catastrophe for many coun-
tries, especially in those with high poverty rates and energy deficit (Benzi 
and Zapata, 2012; Trinkunas, 2014).
Sardinas et al. (2009) highlight the positive impact on the urban devel-
opment of the Cuban city of Cienfuegos as a result of the improved perfor-
mance of the Camilo Cienfuegos refinery, a PetroCaribe project focused 
on infrastructure investment. However, the energy agreement is subject 
to the same criticisms, in general, of energy subsidies. For some authors, 
PetroCaribe represents an uneconomical energy practice with limited social 
and economic benefits and rather an increased debt for the participating 
countries. The high dependence on a single source of subsidized oil, has 
sustained the dependence on fuel for power generation, discouraging the 
transition to alternative, more efficient and less expensive feedstock for elec-
tricity. Environmentally, the discouragement in the investment of  renewable 
sources exacerbates the use of fossil fuels, jeopardizing the regional efforts 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Di Bella et al., 2015; Goldwyn and Gill, 
2014; Johnston, 2014; Lacayo, 2013).
table 1  
real and accrued SuPPlIeS, and QuotaS
2014 2005–2014
Country Quota
Average 2014 Quota Fulfillment Supplies
MBD (thousands of 
barrels per day) % MMBIs
The Dominican 
Republic
30 10.1 34 91.1
Jamaica 23.5 22.3 95 83.5
Nicaragua 27 22.3 83 64.3
Haiti 14 15.2 109 32.6
Guyana 5.2 4.1 79 11.5
Antigua and 
Barbuda
4.4 0.7 16 2.9
Grenada 1 0.5 50 2
St.Kitts and 
Nevis
1.2 0.7 58 1.8
Dominica 1 0.2 20 1
St. Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines
1 0.5 50 0.9
Belize 4 3.2 80 2.9
Suriname 10 1.4 14 3.2
El Salvador 7 6.5 93 15
Total 
PetroCaribe
129.3 87.7 68 313
Cuba 98 72.7 74 2
Source: (PDVSA, 2014, 2015).
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3 methodology
As mentioned in Section 1, we evaluate the impact of PetroCaribe. Impact 
evaluation techniques compare outcomes for treated unit with counterfac-
tual baselines to estimate what would have happened without an interven-
tion. The counterfactual is never observed but is estimated using outcomes 
in similar units, with similar characteristics. A common strategy to estimate 
such interventions is the difference-in-differences model (DiD). The DiD 
compares the difference before and after the intervention in the outcome of 
a treated unit and the control group to determine the net impact. However, 
the main drawback of the DiD is its key assumption of parallel trends, i.e. it 
is assumed that in the absence of the intervention, the treatment and control 
group would have had the same trend across time. To overcome the afore-
mentioned issue, we use the synthetic control method (SCM) developed 
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and further developed by Abadie et al. 
(2010, 2015). The SCM relaxes the parallel trend assumption and constructs 
a synthetic control match for the treated unit by using untreated units in the 
control group in such a way that the synthetic counterfactual has a similar 
behavior to the actual treated unit before the intervention.
Since the pioneering work of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) who use 
this approach to analyze the economic effect of terrorism in the Basque 
country, the SCM has been used in economics and other social science to 
analyze a wide range of interventions. For example, Abadie et al. (2010), 
study the effects of a tobacco prevention legislation in California in 1988 on 
tobacco consumption. Hope (2016) investigates the effect of the Economic 
Monetary Union on the account balance. Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) 
estimate the effect of trade liberalization on economic growth. Sills et al. 
(2015) employ this method in investigating the impact of a local policy ini-
tiative to limit deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Grier and Maynard 
(2016) evaluate the impact of the president Hugo Chavez on the Venezuelan 
economy.
Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 
2015), let us assume that we observe countries i = 1, …, N + J. Countries 1 to 
N are exposed to the intervention (here, are signatories of the PetroCaribe 
programme) at time 
[
T0 + 1
]
 and the remaining J countries form the donor 
pool from which the synthetic control countries are created. Let YPC
it
 be the 
outcome variable observed for country i, member of PetroCaribe (PC) at 
time t. Similarly, let YNP
it
 be the outcome variable observed for country i, not 
member of PetroCaribe (NP), at time t.
The outcome variable for any country i at time t can be written as: 
(1)Yit=Y
NP
it
+훼itSit.
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where 훼it is the effect of the intervention for country i at time t, and Sit is a 
binary indicator variable that takes the value one if the intervention has 
taken place and value zero otherwise.
Assuming a single signatory (i.e. N = 1), the effect of PetroCaribe for 
country 1 (i.e. i = 1 and t ≥ T0) in equation (1) can be defined as: 
In equation (2) the only observed variable is YPC
1t
, hence the counterfac-
tual YNP
1t
 can be estimated as follows: 
where 훿t is a vector of common time-specific factors constant across coun-
tries; 휃t is a vector of unknown parameters; Zi is a (r × 1) vector of observed 
covariates not affected by the intervention, which can be either time-invari-
ant or time-varying; 휆t is a (1 × F) vector of unobserved common factors, 휇i 
is a (F × 1) vector of unknown unit specific factors, and 휀it are idiosyncratic 
error terms with zero mean.
Let us define a synthetic control unit as a weighted average of countries 
in the donor pool. That is, it can be represented by a (J × 1) vector of weights 
W =
(
w2, … ,wJ + 1
)�
 such that wj ≥ 0 for j = 2, ⋯ ,J + 1 and 
∑J + 1
j = 2
wj = 1. 
Each value of the vector W represents a potential synthetic control for a 
PetroCaribe country, for which its outcome variable is defined by: 
Suppose there is a vector of weights 
(
w∗
2
, … ,w∗
J + 1
)�
 such that: 
i.e. the weighted average of the pre-treatment outcomes of the control per-
fectly matches the pre-treatment outcomes of the treated country and the 
weighted average of the covariates of the control perfectly replicates the 
covariates of the treated country. Then, the estimated treatment effect for 
the treated country can be estimated as: 
Conditions in equation (5) hold exactly only if 
(
Y1t,Z1
)
 belongs to the 
convex hull of 
[(
Y21, … ,Y2T0 ,Z
�
2
)
, … ,
(
YJ + 11, … ,YJ + 1T0 ,Z
�
J + 1
)]
, i.e. 
(2)훼1t=Y
PC
1t
−YNP
1t
.
(3)Y
NP
1t
=훿t+휃tZi+휆t휇i+휀it,
(4)
J + 1∑
j = 2
wjYjt = 훿t + 휃t
J + 1∑
j = 2
wjZj + 휆t
J + 1∑
j = 2
wj휇j +
J + 1∑
j = 2
wj휀jt.
(5)Y1t =
J + 1∑
j = 2
w∗
j
Yjt, ∀ t∈{1,… ,T0} and Z1 =
J + 1∑
j = 2
w∗
j
zj holds,
(6)?̂?1t = Y1t−
J + 1∑
j = 2
w∗
j
Yit, ∀ t∈{T0 + 1,… ,T}.
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there should exist some combination of untreated units that exactly match 
the treated country before the treatment. Usually, is not possible to estimate 
a perfect synthetic control because there are no weights w∗
j
 for condition (5) 
to hold exactly. Thus, in practice, W ∗ is estimated in a non-parametric fash-
ion and is selected such that (5) holds approximately. W ∗ is selected by min-
imizing the distance between the vector of characteristics (covariates and 
pre-treatment outcomes) of the signatory countries (X1) and the weighted 
matrix that contains the same characteristics of each potential donor pool 
(X0W ) in the pre-treatment period.
Formally, let the vector K =
(
k1, … , kT0
)�
 define a linear combination 
of pre-treatment outcomes Y
K
j
=
∑T0
s= 1
ksYjs ∀j ∈ {1, … , J + 1}. Let us 
consider N of such linear combinations be define by the vectors 
(
K1, … ,KN
)
. 
X1 is a (k × 1) vector defined as: X1 =
(
Z�
1
,Y
K1
1
, … ,Y
KN
1
)
 containing k co-
variates and pre-treatment outcomes of the signatory country. Similarly, 
X0 is a (k × J) matrix that contains the same variables for each country in 
the donor pool. The differences between the pre-treatment characteristic 
of the PetroCaribe countries and a synthetic control is given by the vector ‖X1−X0W‖. The vector W ∗ is chosen so that it minimizes: 
where W is a weighting vector that measures the relative importance of each 
control country in the construction of the synthetic control, and V is a (k × k) 
symmetric and positive definite diagonal matrix that reflects the relative 
importance of each covariate and pre-treatment outcome. The choice of V 
influences the root mean square error of the estimator (RMSPE). Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003) suggest to choose a V such that the RMSPE of the 
outcome variable is minimized for the pre-intervention period: 
While the choice of the covariates Zi can be justified by selecting those 
variables that better explain the outcome variable, there is no consensus on 
the optimal set of pre-treatment outcomes (Y
K
j
) that need to be included 
as predictors. Abadie et al. (2010) suggest as an obvious solution to use the 
values of the outcome variable for all the pre-treatment years, Bohn et al. 
(2014), Gobillon and Magnac (2016) use this approach. However, Kaul et al. 
(2017) show that including all pre-treatment outcomes as predictor leads 
to all other predictors receiving zero weights. Another very common spec-
ification is to use the average of the pre-treatment outcome, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2015), Kleven et al. (2013) among others, 
(7)‖X1−X0W‖V = ��X1−X0W�� V �X1−X0W�
(8)RMSPE =
√√√√√ 1
T0
T0∑
1
(
Y1t−
J + 1∑
j = 2
w∗
j
Yjt
)2
.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Manchester School10
perform their analysis with this linear combination. Bove et al. (2014) select 
four out of ten pre-treatment period to analyze the impact of civil war on 
GDP. Montalvo (2011) uses only the last two pre-treatment values.
Based on the previous discussion, we test five different placebo specifi-
cations that differ only in the linear combination of lagged outcome vari-
able used as predictor. For each specification, we compute the SCM on each 
country j in the donor pool as treated4:
1. The average of all pre-treatment outcomes: Xj =
�∑T0
t= 1
Yj, t
T0
�
.
2. The last pre-intervention period: Xj =
[
Yj,T0
]
.
3. The first and last period of the pre-treatment: Xj =
[
Yj, 1,Yj,T0
]
.
4. The first, half and last period of the pre-treatment: Xj =
[
Yj, 1,Yj, T0
2
),Yj,T0
]
.
5. The first, two half and last two periods: 
Xj =
[
Yj, 1,Yj, T0
2
,Y
j,
T0
2
+ 1
,Yj,T0−1,Yj,T0
]
.
We calculate the post-treatment RMSPE of each specification. As sug-
gested by Ferman et al. (2016), since the control countries did not experi-
ence the intervention, we ideal specification will be the one with the lowest 
RMSPE in the post-treatment period: 
Once the proper specification is selected, it is vital that the weighted 
synthetic outcomes match the outcomes for the treated country in the 
pre-treatment period. To assess whether the synthetic country is a good 
counterfactual, we estimate the R2 statistic, the coefficient of determina-
tin or the fraction of variance explained. This is essentially one minus the 
pre-treatment MSE normalized by the variance of the treated country: 
R2 can range from minus infinite to 1. An R2 of 1 indicates a perfect match. 
If R2 = 0 then the estimated synthetic is no more accurate than the aver-
age of the observed data, and a negative R2 occurs when the mean of the 
 observed data is a better counterfactual than the estimated synthetic con-
trol. Best fit is a matter of judgment (Sills et al., 2015) that in this case hinges 
on the outcome of interest.
4As explained is Section 3, we construct country-specific donor pool for each PetroCaribe 
country and its outcome of interest.Thus, specifications (iv) and (v) vary from country to 
country depending on the outcome and donor pool.
(9)mins∈S
[
1
(T −T0)J
J + 1∑
j = 2
T∑
t=T0 + 1
(
Yj,t− Ŷ
s
j,t
)2]
.
(10)R2 = 1−
MSE
𝜎2
1
= 1−
∑T0
t= 1
�
y1t− ŷit
�2∑T0
t= 1
�
y1t−y1
�2 .
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To assess statistical significance, we conduct a series of placebo tests 
closely following Abadie et al. (2015). The first placebo test, known as in-
space placebo, consists in iteratively applying the SCM on each country 
of the donor pool as if it was treated. Since the control country did not 
receive any intervention, we should not expect a treatment effect. If the 
placebo studies exhibits a treatment effect of similar magnitude to the one 
estimated for the actual treated country, we conclude that this treatment 
effect is driven entirely by chance and that the analysis does not provide a 
convincing evidence of a treatment effect.
However, we take into consideration that some control countries in the 
placebo experiments can have a bad pre-treatment fit with the consequent 
large RMSPE, casting doubt on their reliability. In order to avoid mislead-
ing conclusions, we drop placebo runs with a pre-treatment RMSPEs that 
are at last 1.5 times higher than that of the PetroCaribe country.
Since this visual analysis involves some amount of subjectivity, we ad-
ditionally estimate the post-treatment RMSPE to the pre-treatment RMSPE 
ratios: 
This scale-free measure allows to estimate the extremity of the impact 
of the placebo experiments. The empirical distribution of the ratios allows 
to compute pseudo p-values as follows: 
The pseudo p-values constructed in this context imply that if the treat-
ment were to be assigned at random, then the probability of getting a ratio 
at least as large as the one estimated for the PetroCaribe country is 1/J + 1 
(Abadie et al., 2010). Note that the pseudo p-values necessarily depend on 
the number of control countries, meaning that some values cannot be sig-
nificant at conventional levels (one-tailed test), which does not imply the 
absence of an effect.
As a second validation check, we test the sensitivity of the baseline 
model to the countries in the control pool. The so-called leave-one-out test 
consists in iteratively apply the baseline SCM omitting in each iteration one 
of the countries that received a positive weight in the baseline specification.5 
(11)ratioi =
�
1
T−T0
∑T
t=T0 + 1
�
yit−
∑
j≠i ŵ
j
i
yjt
�2
�
1
T0
∑T0
t= 1
�
yit−
∑
j≠i ŵ
j
i
yjt
�2 .
(12)p-value = Pr
(
�𝛽SC > �𝛽PC
)
=
1
J + 1
J + 1∑
i = 1
I
(
�𝛽SC
iT
≥ �𝛽PC
1T
)
.
5Countries that received zero weight do not change the results of the baseline model.
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This allows assessing whether one of the control countries is driving the re-
sults. If the synthetic control follows a similar trajectory, then it is less likely 
that the results are biased to the inclusion of any single control country.
4 data and SPecIfIcatIon
The analysis focuses on the effect of PetroCaribe on four outcomes of in-
terest: (i) economic development, represented by GDP per capita; (ii) so-
cial development, represented by the Human Development Index; (iii) CO2 
per capita emissions; and iv) electricity use per capita . For covariates, we 
include the lags of the outcome variable and a set of standard predictors 
with a stable relationship with the outcome variable. These variables, dis-
played in Table 2, were selected by their predictive power based on empiri-
cal literature (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Almer and Winkler, 2012; 
Eren et al., 2014; Larivière and Lafrance, 1999) and availability. The period 
under consideration for economic growth and social development is 1990 to 
2014, while for per capita CO2 emissions and electricity use is 1980 to 2013. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix C. Sources and definitions are 
provided in Appendix G.
4.1 Treated Countries And Donor Pool
Although PetroCaribe officially has 18 members, three countries, the 
Bahamas, Guatemala and St. Lucia never entered into a bilateral agreement 
and are thus omitted from the analysis. For the remaining countries, we 
impose the following conditions: (i) the treatment needs to be sustained 
through a significant period, otherwise, if the post-treatment period is 
short, the SCM cannot estimate any real treatment effect. Four countries do 
not meet this condition. Belize and Honduras had interruptions in their 
supply.6 Suriname and El Salvador joined at a later date, 2012 and 2014 
6Belize stopped importing oil in 2009 (Mencias, 2016). Venezuela suspended the agreement 
with Honduras in June 2009 following the coup d’etat against then president Manuel 
Zelaya.
table 2  
lISt of covarIateS
Economic growth Social development CO2 emissions Electricity use
Lags of GDP Lags of HDI Lags of CO2 Lags of electricity 
use
Industry share GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita
Services share Access electricity Trade openness Urban population
Agriculture share Internet Urban population Population density
School enrollment Urban population Industry share Industry share
Internet Services share Services share
Urban population Agriculture share Inflation
Inflation
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 respectively. (ii) The treated country cannot be an outlier in the dataset. 
Recalling that countries with extreme values of observed characteristics are 
unlikely to satisfy condition (5) in Section 2, in such case, the SCM cannot 
give a correct prediction. In this regard, Haiti was excluded. Being the poor-
est country in Latin America and the Caribbean, and one of the poorest in 
the world, US$1,737 in 2014, its outcomes of interest lie in the extremes, 
which make it difficult to build a donor pool with countries of similar char-
acteristics. (iii) Countries do not have to be exposed to other significant 
shocks during the treatment period. Two countries do not satisfy this condi-
tion. Haiti suffered losses equivalent to 113 per cent of GDP as a result of an 
earthquake that struck the country in 2010 (ECLAC, 2014), three years after 
joining PetroCaribe. In Jamaica, high fluctuation in its GDP, CO2 emissions 
and energy consumption are a major results of the closure of three of four 
bauxite and alumina plants in 2008; bauxite industry is the largest contribu-
tor to its GDP.
Regarding the treatment date, for some beneficiaries the delivery of 
oil was not made immediately after the signing of the agreement, but it was 
delayed a few years. Therefore, the treatment date is established as the year 
in which the countries received the first cargo of oil. Table 3 shows the treat-
ment date considered in the analysis.
Taking into consideration the heterogeneous characteristics of the 
PetroCaribe beneficiaries, we build a country-specific donor pool for each 
outcome of interest. The potential donor pool is restricted to the follow-
ing conditions: (i) the countries need to remain unexposed to the interven-
tion through the period under study; (ii) to avoid interpolation bias, which 
might occur by interpolating across countries with different observed char-
acteristics, the donor pool is limited to countries that closely resemble the 
PetroCaribe members. As a first filter, we selected countries that belong to 
the same income level as the PetroCaribe countries, according to the World 
table 3  
treatment date
Country Signed Treatment date Country Signed Treatment date
Antigua 
and 
Barbuda
2005 2006 Jamaica 2005 2005
Cuba 2000 2002 Nicaragua 2007 2007
Dominica 2005 2006 Dominican 
Republic
2005 2005
Grenada 2005 2007 St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines
2005 2005
Guyana 2005 2007 St.Kitts and Nevis 2005 2008
Haiti 2007 2007
Source: ECCB (2015), GRENLEC (2007), Guyana Embassy, López and Villani (2014), Romero (2010), 
SELA (2013), WikiLeaks (2006).
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Bank classification (World Bank, 2017). Later, we choose as donor pool 
those countries which values of the outcome variable lie within the range 
of the 50 percent of the value of the outcome of interest of the PetroCaribe 
country. This is a crucial step in the construction of the synthetic country, 
since if the control countries are not sufficiently similar, any difference in 
the outcome of the two sets may simply reflect disparities in their character-
istics (Abadie et al., 2015). The donor pool as well as the descriptive statistics 
are shown in Appendix C.
5 reSultS
As mentioned in Section 2, the first step in the analysis involves the choice 
of the appropriate specification, i.e. the one that minimizes the RMSPE for 
each country and outcome of interest. For the sake of brevity, the results of 
each specification are shown in Appendix A. Control country and covariate 
weights are displayed in Appendix B. Robustness is discussed in the con-
text of the main findings. The results of the placebo test are displayed in 
Appendix D, E and F.
5.1 Economic Growth
As mentioned in Section 4, Haiti and Jamaica are removed from main anal-
ysis because they did not satisfy the conditions to carry out an adequate 
analysis. On one hand, the extreme low values of Haiti compared to the 
donor pool, and the exogenous significant shock in Jamaica. For illustrative 
table 4  
fIt and treatment effectS on gdP Per caPIta
Country Pre-treatment fit
Average 
effect (%) Gap 2014 (%) Pseudo p-valueb
Antigua and 
Barbuda
0.186a 4.41 0.108 0.4(4/10)
Cuba 0.867 26.29 41.550 0.066 (1/15)
Dominica 0.938 11.910 14.190 0.0833 (1/12)
Grenada 0.862 −5.430 −5.300 0.2308 (3/13)
Guyana 0.565 11.190 12.910 0.125 (1/8)
Haiti −4.741a −10.450 −13.840 0.45 (5/11)
Jamaica 0.086a −18.390 −27.410 0.0833 (1/12)
Nicaragua 0.880 −9.300 −12.350 0.125 (1/8)
Dominican 
Rep
0.829 7.390 14.580 0.2 (2/10)
St.Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines
0.864 −1.870 −9.200 0.5 (5/10)
St.Kitts and 
Nevis
0.919 −4.030 −0.050 0.5 (5/10)
aCountries not included in the main analysis due to poor fit.
bp-values calculated based on placebo tests.
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purposes, both circumstances are reflected in the low values of the pre-
treatment fit shown in Table 4. For Antigua and Barbuda, the pre-treatment 
fit is weak, with a low value of 0.186. Moreover, the results are not robust to 
any falsification test performed (see appendixes D, E and F), thus, Antigua 
and Barbuda is also dropped from the main analysis.
Fig. 1 illustrates the synthetic control estimates for the PetroCaribe 
countries with a good pre-treatment fit, as mentioned in Table 4.
In four countries, PetroCaribe significantly boosted economic devel-
opment. The largest effect can be seen in Cuba, with an average gain of 
26.29 percent in GDP per capita and a gain of 41.55 percent in 2014. The 
results are highly robust to the placebo test, with a pseudo p-value of 0.066. 
In Dominica, the pre-treatment fit of 0.938 is nearly perfect. The average 
gain in its per capita GDP due to PetroCaribe is 11.19 per cent and in 2014 
per capita GDP is 14.19 per cent higher than it would have been without 
the agreement. Guyana experienced an average gain in the post-treatment 
period of 11.19 per cent, while in the Dominican Republic, the gain was 
7.39per cent. All the results are robust to the placebo test, which is reflected 
in the pseudo p-value, and to the leave-one-out test, i.e. the positive effect of 
PetroCaribe in is not driven by any control country in the donor pool.
In contrast, Grenada, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
St. Kitts and Nevis, did not experience a higher per capita GDP than they 
would have had without PetroCaribe. Grenada, which received the first 
fIg. 1. Treated vs. Synthetic Control. GDP per capita
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shipment of oil in 2007, experienced during the post-treatment period a per 
capita GDP that was 5.43per cent below its synthetic counterfactual. As can 
be seen in Fig. 1, Grenada experienced a decrease in its per capita GDP in 
2008, while its synthetic counterfactual continued with the growing trend. 
The gap narrows towards the end of the post-treatment period, with a gap 
of −5.3 per cent in 2014. In Nicaragua, the SCM estimated an average de-
crease in the post-treatment period of −9.3 per cent in per capita GDP. As in 
Grenada, Nicaragua experienced a decrease in its per capita GDP in 2008 
while the trend in its synthetic continued upwards. In both countries, results 
are robust to the placebo test.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St. Kitts and Nevis also show 
an average decrease in their per capita GDP, −1.87 per cent and −4.03 per 
cent percent, respectively. However, the results are not robust. The pseudo 
p-value in both countries indicate that the probability to obtain a placebo 
country with an effect higher or equal to that experienced in the treated 
country is fifty percent, concluding that the effect of PetroCaribe in both 
countries is not statistically significant.
5.2 Social Development
The impact of PetroCaribe on social development is estimated only in 
six countries due to data availability. As can be seen in Table 5, the SCM 
achieved a good pre-treatment fit in all countries. Fig. 2 illustrates the effect 
of PetroCaribe on the Human Development Index.
Only Cuba experienced a positive effect. Twelve years after the 
Agreement, the HDI is 0.16 percent points higher than its synthetic coun-
terpart. In Guyana and Haiti, PetroCaribe is not reflected in an increase 
in their HDI. The results are fairly robust to the placebo tests. Jamaica did 
not experience a higher HDI in comparison with its counterfactual, how-
ever, the results are not statistically significant, therefore, we can not drive 
conclusions about the real effects of PetroCaribe in the country. Finally, in 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, PetroCaribe had no discernible 
effect, the divergence from their respective counterfactuals is small.The re-
sults in both countries are statistically significant.
5.3 Carbon Dioxide Emissions Per Capita
The synthetic control method could estimate a good match in the pre- 
treatment period for all the countries except for Cuba. As can be seen in 
Table 6, the pre-treatment fit in Cuba is −0.379, thus, we exclude this coun-
try from the main analysis.
Fig. 3 plots the trajectories of the PetroCaribe countries and their es-
timated synthetic counterfactual. First, let us focus on the case of Antigua 
and Barbuda and Guyana, the only two countries that experienced higher 
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levels of CO2 per capita emissions at the end of the treatment period, com-
pared to their synthetic estimates. Antigua and Barbuda exhibit an average 
increase of 6.80 per cent with a difference of 16.91 per cent at the end of the 
table 6  
fIt and treatment effectS on CO2 Per caPIta emISSIonS
Country Pre-treatment fit
Average 
effect (%) Gap 2013(%) Pseudo p-valueb
Antigua and 
Barbuda
0.6102 6.80 16.91 0.083 (1/12)
Cuba −0.3799a 0.47 −2.04 0.928 (13/14)
Dominica 0.9251 −13.06 −17.72 0.2 (2/10)
Grenada 0.9390 5.03 19.26 0.461 (6/13)
Guyana 0.6191 7.88 14.31 0.5 (5/10)
Jamaica 0.8173 −27.60 −49.10 0.066 (1/15)
Nicaragua 0.9587 0.30 −11.32 0.333 (3/9)
The 
Dominican 
Rep.
0.8378 −5.79 −10.44 0.667 (6/9)
St. Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines
0.9074 7.56 −6.62 0.273 (3/11)
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
0.7959 1.47 −4.17 0.6 (6/10)
aCountry not include in the main analysis due to poor fit.
bp-values calculated based on placebo tests.
fIg. 2. Treated vs. Synthetic Control. Human Development Index (HDI)
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treatment period. The pseudo p-value of 0.083 gives us confidence in our 
results, as does the robustness seen in the leave-one-out test. Guyana has an 
average increase of 7.88 per cent and at the end of the treatment period, the 
CO2 per capita emissions are 14.3 per cent higher than that of its synthetic 
counterfactual. However, the placebo test shows that 4 of the 10 control 
countries have a higher pre/post-RSME than that of Guyana. As such, we 
cannot conclude that PetroCaribe increased emissions in this country. In 
Grenada, the path of the treated is slightly higher than the synthetic coun-
terfactual, 5.03 per cent on average. With a pseudo p-value of 0.461 and a 
highly robust leave-one-out test, the results for Grenada are statistically 
significant.
We next move to the countries where PetroCaribe had a negative or 
close to zero effect in their CO2 per capita emissions, i.e. have a lower level 
of emissions compared to their counterfactual. Dominica has, on average, 
13.06 per cent less emissions than what would have had without PetroCaribe. 
At the end of the post-treatment period, the emissions are 17.72 per cent 
lower than those of its synthetic. In Nicaragua, the estimated effect of the 
agreement at the end of the treatment is a difference of −11.32 per cent in 
comparison with its counterfactual. St. Vincent and the Grenadines has an 
estimated effect of 6.62 per cent fewer emissions than its counterfactual. The 
effects are statistically significant in all these countries.
fIg. 3. Treated vs. Synthetic Control. CO2 per capita emissions
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Finally, the Dominican Republic experienced an average decline of 5.79 
during the treatment period, while St. Kitts and Nevis has a small difference 
of −4.17 per cent compared to its synthetic counterfactual. The effects, how-
ever, are not statistically robust to the placebo test, nor to the leave-one-out 
test. Therefore, we cannot be confident about the true effect.
Summing up, there is little evidence that PetroCaribe led to an increase 
in per capita CO2 emissions in the member countries.
5.4 Electricity Use Per Capita
In the study of the effect of PetroCaribe in per capita electricity, the SCM 
was not able to estimate a good pre-treatment match for Antigua and 
Barbuda, Guyana and the Dominican Republic. These three countries and 
Jamaica are removed from the main analysis. As can be seen in Table 7 
and Fig. 4, in the rest of the countries, the pre-treatment fit is fairly good.
Although all countries show an upward trend in their electricity con-
sumption, only two countries, Nicaragua and St. Kitts and Nevis, increased 
their electricity consumption after joining PetroCaribe. In Nicaragua, the 
increase was on average 4.85 per cent during the treatment period and in 
2014, the last treatment year, the electricity use was 7.11 per cent higher than 
that of its synthetic estimate. The effects, however, are not statistically sig-
nificant. In St. Kitts and Nevis, the electricity consumption was, on aver-
age, 17.12 per cent higher than that its counterfactual. The pseudo p-value 
is 0.083, highly statistically significant. In contrast, electricity use in Cuba 
and Grenada is less than the electricity use in heir synthetic estimates. For 
table 7  
fIt and treatment effectS on electrIcIty uSe Per caPIta
Country Pre-treatment fit
Average 
effect (%) Gap 2013 (%) Pseudo p-valueb
Antigua and 
Barbuda
0.549a 16.78 13.21 0.58 (7/12)
Cuba 0.858 −13.95 −15.73 0.125 (1/8)
Dominica 0.865 −5.70 −12.68 0.714 (5/7)
Grenada 0.862 −11.78 −20.97 0.111 (1/9)
Guyana 0.420a 13.12 20.25 0.833 (10/12)
Jamaica 0.700 −49.24 −69.58 0.071 (1/14)
Nicaragua 0.707 4.85 7.11 0.571 (4/7)
Dominican 
Rep
0.520a −6.62 −16.90 0.727 (8/11)
St. Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines
0.969 0.62 −11.73 0.222 (2/9)
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
0.627 17.12 23.00 0.083 (1/12)
aCountry not include in the main analysis due to poor fit.
bp-values calculated based on placebo tests.
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Cuba, the SCM estimated an average difference of −13.95 per cent. For 
Grenada, the effect is −11.78 per cent. The pseudo p-value in both countries 
is statistically significant. Dominica also experienced a per capita electric-
ity use lower that than its counterfactual. The effect, however, is not robust 
to the placebo test, neither for the leave-one-out. Finally, in St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, PetroCaribe had an average effect close to zero, 0.62 per 
cent higher than the synthetic counterfactual.
6 concluSIon and PolIcy ImPlIcatIonS
We use synthetic controls to investigate the effect of the PetroCaribe Energy 
Cooperation Agreement on economic growth, human development, carbon 
dioxide emissions and electricity use. The PetroCaribe Agreement caused 
an increase in economic growth in five of the nine countries analyzed: Cuba, 
Dominica, Guyana, the Dominican Republic and St. Kitts and Nevis. The 
impact on Nicaragua is negative but small. In Grenada and St. Vincent, the 
result is not robust to the placebo test. Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
have the largest oil quota among all the members.
However, the positive effects on economic growth are not reflected in 
social development, a key target of PetroCaribe. Only Cuba had a positive 
difference of 0.16 percent points against its counterfactual. None of the 
other countries achieved a higher Human Development Index compared 
fIg. 4. Treated vs. Synthetic Control. Electricity use per capita
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to their synthetic control. Although all show an overall increase in their 
HDI during the period under analysis, PetroCaribe did not have the posi-
tive impact that was expected by its sponsors. These results contradict the 
conclusion of SELA 2015, p. 20) that PetroCaribe “has made a bigger con-
tribution” on the HDI in the beneficiary countries. Rather, they confirm 
one criticism of energy subsidies, that they do not always improve the social 
development of individuals. The Human Development Index is dominated 
by education and health, which are stock variables that change only slowly 
over time. PetroCaribe does not have an impact in the short run analyzed 
here, but it may have in the long run.
PetroCaribe had no effect on per capita CO2 emissions. Emissions nei-
ther increased—as may have been expected from a programme that subsi-
dizes oil—nor fell—the stated intention of the recipient countries. Although 
some countries show an increase in emissions, the difference with their 
counterfactual is minimal. We can conclude that PetroCaribe did not result 
in a worsening of CO2 per capita emissions. As economic growth acceler-
ated, this implies that PetroCaribe must have reduced the carbon intensity 
of the recipient economies.
Regarding electricity use, some results are positive and others nega-
tive, but only two are statistically significant and economically meaning-
ful. Jamaica saw a large drop, and St. Kitts and Nevis a large increase. 
However, these outcomes are not strongly supported by the leave-one-out 
test. Nicaragua, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
were beneficiaries of a series of power generation projects, supported by 
PetroCaribe. Access to cheaper oil for power generation and accelerated 
growth appears to have been offset by greater efficiency, perhaps in terms of 
reduced transmission and distribution losses, which are around 20 per cent, 
one of the highest in the world. We cannot draw firm conclusions about the 
effects of PetroCaribe on electricity use in its member countries.
The policy implication is that an energy subsidy like PetroCaribe can 
promote economic development in the beneficiary countries without a sig-
nificant worsening of per capita CO2 emissions. PetroCaribe can provide 
the insights and evidence that oil subsidies of this type, in which the savings 
derived from the oil bill are destined for a series of energy infrastructure 
along with social development programs are not incongruent with the dis-
course of sustainable development.
Further research should investigate how a subsidy of this kind impacts 
the development of renewable energy sources, and whether it acts as a dis-
incentive to the transition towards alternative sources of energy. This is of 
particular interest for countries that heavily rely on imported fossil fuel 
for power generation. A deeper analysis into the impact of PetroCaribe on 
the structure of economic activity and public expenditure would be useful. 
The analysis here should be repeated when the data allow for an analysis 
of the impact in the long run. The limitations of the methodology used did 
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not allow us to estimate the impact of PetroCaribe in Haiti, the poorest 
country among the beneficiaries and the most dependent on Venezuelan 
oil. We need better counterfactuals for this country. Lack of fit for some 
countries, should not be interpreted as a lack of effect. Another caveat is 
that the synthetic control method does not explicitly consider the interac-
tions and spillovers between the treated countries, whose economies are in-
tegrated. Furthermore, PetroCaribe is a composite treatment, not just the 
programme itself but also through its geopolitical realignment. All this is 
deferred to future research.
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a P Pe n dI x b:  We I g h t S
GDP Per Capita
table b1  
antIgua and barbuda
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 ln GDP(1990) 9.750 9.763 0.000
Bahamas 0.502 ln GDP(1997) 9.808 9.804 0.453
Barbados 0.283 ln GDP(2005) 9.972 9.964 0.320
Chile 0 Trade openness 149.644 102.109 0.062
Costa Rica 0 Industry share 17.705 22.461 0.038
Trinidad & T 0.105 Services share 79.049 70.016 0.000
Uruguay 0 Agriculture share 3.246 3.633 0.000
Malaysia 0.11 G. primary 111.139 98.833 0.005
Turkey 0 G. secondary 98.923 88.747 0.033
Internet (1996) 2.858 1.122 0.016
Internet (2004) 24.267 32.623 0.010
Urban pop 32.851 57.715 0.054
Inflation (99–05) 1.689 2.218 0.010
RMSPE 0.05526556
table b2  
cuba
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 ln GDP(1993) 9.107 9.123 0.288
Bahamas 0.319 ln GDP(2000) 9.332 9.333 0.433
Barbados 0.066 ln GDP(2001) 9.360 9.343 0.252
Chile 0 Trade openness 30.688 76.243 0.001
Colombia 0 Industry share 23.802 25.587 0.009
Costa Rica 0 Services share 67.148 65.241 0.007
Ecuador 0 Agriculture share 9.050 8.258 0.006
Panama 0 G. primary 102.065 109.399 0.000
Peru 0.237 G. secondary 81.350 76.558 0.003
Uruguay 0 Internet (1996) 0.032 0.652 0.000
Malaysia 0 Urban pop 74.694 68.698 0.002
Thailand 0
Tunisia 0.378
Fiji 0
RMSPE 0.031914
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table b3  
domInIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.069 ln GDP(1990) 8.814 8.820 0.134
Colombia 0 ln GDP(1996) 8.914 8.946 0.289
Ecuador 0 ln GDP(2005) 9.089 9.066 0.347
Guatemala 0 Trade openness 106.950 118.836 0.024
Paraguay 0 Industry share 19.156 21.157 0.031
Peru 0 Services share 62.930 66.613 0.000
Lucia 0.571 Agriculture share 17.914 12.230 0.030
Indonesia 0 G. primary 113.306 114.794 0.020
Philippines 0 G. secondary 103.145 74.107 0.036
Tunisia 0 Internet (1996) 1.166 0.420 0.027
Fiji 0.36 Internet (2004) 30.320 15.192 0.032
Urban pop 65.112 36.653 0.002
Inflation (97–05) 1.386 2.716 0.028
RMSPE 0.0229004
table b4  
domInIcan rePublIc
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 ln GDP (1990) 8.569 8.624 0.000
Costa Rica 0 ln GDP (1995) 8.730 8.745 0.455
Ecuador 0 ln GDP (1996) 8.782 8.792 0.000
Paraguay 0 ln GDP (2003) 9.008 8.986 0.345
Peru 0.147 ln GDP (2004) 9.006 9.036 0.000
Uruguay 0 Trade openness 78.918 78.488 0.018
Indonesia 0.018 Industry share 33.438 31.836 0.015
Thailand 0.071 Services share 57.073 55.389 0.000
Tunisia 0.763 Agriculture 
share
9.488 12.706 0.026
G. primary 105.194 113.649 0.007
G. secondary 55.863 63.736 0.000
Internet (1996) 0.075 0.066 0.026
Internet (2004) 8.866 9.385 0.017
Urban pop 59.591 60.774 0.084
Inflation 
(97–04)
15.042 3.291 0.007
RMSPE 0.048652
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table b5  
grenada
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Barbados 0.396 ln GDP(1990) 8.921 8.970 0.133
Colombia 0 ln GDP(1995) 8.926 9.013 0.000
Costa Rica 0 ln GDP(1996) 8.960 9.049 0.261
Ecuador 0 ln GDP(2005) 9.384 9.269 0.000
Paraguay 0 ln GDP(2006) 9.340 9.319 0.349
Peru 0.243 Trade openness 100.548 74.035 0.005
Uruguay 0 Industry share 20.566 25.123 0.052
Angola 0 Services share 71.115 61.646 0.095
Indonesia 0 Agriculture 
share
8.319 7.851 0.019
Philippines 0 G. primary 110.761 109.939 0.023
Thailand 0 G. secondary 102.117 83.546 0.006
Tunisia 0.362 Internet (1996) 0.298 0.224 0.013
Internet (2004) 19.571 26.235 0.021
Urban pop 35.069 53.283 0.007
Inflation 
(97–06)
2.033 3.100 0.018
RMSPE 0.05783058
table b6  
guyana
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Guatemala 0 ln GDP (1993) 8.195 8.337 0.000
Paraguay 0 ln GDP (1998) 8.421 8.377 0.000
Papua N.G. 0.242 ln GDP (1999) 8.446 8.429 0.000
Philippines 0 ln GDP (2005) 8.464 8.500 0.641
Vietnam 0.097 ln GDP (2006) 8.513 8.513 0.000
Fiji 0.661 Trade openness 203.609 117.107 0.120
Ghana 0 Industry share 29.455 27.424 0.007
Services share 36.874 50.311 0.000
Agriculture 
share
33.672 22.265 0.025
G. primary 101.131 96.886 0.046
G. secondary 94.122 63.956 0.074
Internet (1997) 0.132 0.172 0.010
Urban pop 28.750 37.051 0.077
Inflation 
(97–06)
5.395 4.518 0.000
RMSPE 0.056329
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table b7  
JamaIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 ln GDP(1990) 8.910 8.896 0.136
Colombia 0.618 ln GDP(1996) 9.050 9.029 0.460
Ecuador 0 ln GDP(1997) 9.030 9.038 0.000
Guatemala 0.102 ln GDP(2003) 9.050 9.065 0.000
Paraguay 0 ln GDP(2004) 9.058 9.108 0.243
Peru 0 Industry share 29.547 27.779 0.006
Lucia 0.242 Services share 62.983 61.117 0.045
Philippines 0 Agriculture 
share
7.469 11.104 0.025
Thailand 0.038 G. primary 98.113 112.453 0.009
Tunisia 0 G. secondary 82.149 61.766 0.003
Fiji 0 Internet (1996) 0.591 0.373 0.013
Internet (2004) 10.000 11.739 0.058
Urban pop 51.077 56.336 0.002
Inflation 
(97–04)
8.804 7.894 0.002
RMSPE 0.04037694
table b8  
nIcaragua
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.455 ln GDP(1990) 8.013 7.889 0.000
Guatemala 0.083 ln GDP(1995) 7.994 8.019 0.000
Angola 0 ln GDP(1996) 8.037 8.049 0.000
Nigeria 0 ln GDP(2005) 8.241 8.246 0.516
Philippines 0 ln GDP(2006) 8.268 8.282 0.000
Vietnam 0.184 Trade openness 61.690 67.069 0.026
Ghana 0.277 Industry share 23.173 30.344 0.000
Services share 56.674 45.944 0.041
Agriculture 
share
20.153 23.612 0.032
G. primary 104.257 101.295 0.200
G. secondary 52.154 59.726 0.128
Internet (1996) 0.206 0.220 0.020
Internet (2004) 2.321 4.325 0.037
Urban pop 54.256 47.366 0.000
Inflation 
(99–06)
7.917 8.059 0.000
RMSPE 0.039379
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table b9  
St. KIttS and nevIS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 ln GDP(1993) 9.633 9.649 0.256
Bahamas 0.468 ln GDP(1999) 9.820 9.861 0.000
Barbados 0.064 ln GDP(2000) 9.856 9.886 0.000
Chile 0 ln GDP(2006) 9.998 10.006 0.587
Costa Rica 0 ln GDP(2007) 9.983 10.029 0.000
St. Lucia 0 Trade openness 92.215 82.941 0.030
Trinidad & T 0.221 Industry share 26.839 26.267 0.029
Uruguay 0.24 Services share 70.628 68.925 0.000
Malaysia 0.008 Agriculture 
share
2.532 3.982 0.000
G. primary 101.598 102.870 0.002
G. secondary 92.583 89.766 0.031
Internet (1996) 1.946 1.380 0.019
Internet (2004) 24.738 23.889 0.028
Urban pop 32.855 65.152 0.007
Inflation 
(97–07)
3.920 4.515 0.010
RMSPE 0.02674026
table b10  
St.vIncent and the grenadIneS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 ln GDP(1990) 8.626 8.718 0.234
Colombia 0 ln GDP(2004) 9.117 9.063 0.492
Costa Rica 0.419 Trade openness 99.629 83.557 0.037
Ecuador 0 Industry share 20.182 30.828 0.025
Paraguay 0 Services share 70.207 55.592 0.000
Peru 0 Agriculture share 9.611 13.638 0.000
Indonesia 0.033 G. primary 117.224 111.123 0.009
Philippines 0.132 G. secondary 82.566 61.796 0.014
Tunisia 0.416 Internet (1996) 0.483 0.373 0.081
Internet (2004) 7.371 13.038 0.035
Urban pop 44.093 57.124 0.055
Inflation (97–04) 1.211 7.009 0.018
RMSPE 0.054266
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table b11  
haItI
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.177 ln GDP(2005) 7.354 7.354 0.705
Nigeria 0 ln GDP(2006) 7.360 7.370 0.274
Papua N.G 0 Trade openness 48.791 55.510 0.004
Vietnam 0 G. primary 106.444 83.875 0.001
Ghana 0 Internet 2.179 0.796 0.000
Mauritania 0 Urban pop 38.275 33.420 0.015
Nepal 0 Inflation (99–07) 17.162 9.746 0.001
Mali 0.372
Benin 0.408
Madagascar 0.043
RMSPE 0.10551935
table b12  
cuba
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0.557 HDI(1993) 0.656 0.655 0.270
Barbados 0 HDI(1997) 0.669 0.672 0.360
Bolivia 0 HDI(2001) 0.692 0.692 0.368
Chile 0 ln GDP 9.218 9.068 0.002
Colombia 0 Access electricity 97.000 83.278 0.000
Costa Rica 0 Internet(%) 0.323 1.510 0.000
Ecuador 0.214 Urban pop (%) 74.694 72.021 0.000
Panama 0
Paraguay 0
Peru 0
Uruguay 0
Indonesia 0
Malaysia 0
Papua N.G. 0
Philippines 0
Thailand 0
Tunisia 0
Turkey 0.025
Vietnam 0
Fiji 0
Ghana 0.205
RMSPE 0.003359
Human Development Index HDI
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table b13  
domInIcan rePublIc
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Barbados 0.023 HDI(2003) 0.666 0.666 0.661
Bolivia 0.299 HDI(2004) 0.668 0.668 0.337
Colombia 0.367 ln GDP 8.824 8.835 0.001
Costa Rica 0.241 Access electricity 84.100 82.843 0.000
Ecuador 0 Internet(%) 3.027 3.295 0.001
Guatemala 0 Urban pop(%) 59.591 61.707 0.000
Panama 0
Paraguay 0
Peru 0
Uruguay 0
Malaysia 0
Philippines 0
Thailand 0
Tunisia 0
Turkey 0
Fiji 0.07
RMSPE 0.00099634
table b14  
guyana
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.23 HDI(2007) 0.622 0.621 0.653
Colombia 0 HDI(2006) 0.620 0.622 0.345
Guatemala 0 ln GDP 8.346 8.500 0.001
Panama 0.132 Access electricity 73.250 69.140 0.001
Paraguay 0.459 Internet(%) 3.464 2.395 0.000
Peru 0 Urban pop (%) 28.881 49.017 0.000
Indonesia 0
Papua N.G. 0.179
Philippines 0
Tunisia 0
Turkey 0
Vietnam 0
Fiji 0
RMSPE 0.007836
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table b15  
JamaIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 HDI(2004) 0.706 0.705 0.930
Colombia 0 ln GDP 9.012 8.954 0.013
Costa Rica 0.376 Access electricity 85.500 76.886 0.001
Ecuador 0.209 Internet(%) 3.062 3.441 0.023
Guatemala 0 Urban pop (%) 51.077 52.168 0.033
Paraguay 0
Peru 0
Indonesia 0
Thailand 0.037
Fiji 0.378
RMSPE 0.00492658
table b16  
nIcaragua
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.065 HDI(1990) 0.495 0.486 0.007
Colombia 0 HDI(1995) 0.524 0.525 0.287
Guatemala 0.509 HDI(1996) 0.535 0.534 0.209
Paraguay 0 HDI(2005) 0.597 0.595 0.281
Peru 0 HDI(2006) 0.601 0.602 0.214
Indonesia 0.111 ln GDP 8.091 8.356 0.001
Philippines 0 Access electricity 71.500 78.863 0.000
Tunisia 0 Internet(%) 1.061 2.602 0.001
Vietnam 0.314 Urban pop (%) 54.256 38.297 0.000
RMSPE 0.003314
table b17  
haItI
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Benin 0 HDI(1996) 0.426 0.426 0.551
Cameroon 0.414 HDI(2006) 0.458 0.457 0.428
Lesotho 0.112 ln GDP 7.420 7.651 0.015
Mali 0 Access electricity 32.882 24.376 0.005
Mauritania 0 Internet(%) 2.179 0.811 0.001
Niger 0 Urban pop (%) 38.275 27.686 0.001
Papua N.G. 0.475
Senegal 0
Sudan 0
Tanzania 0
Uganda 0
Zimbabwe 0
RMSPE 0.00657025
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CO2 Per Capita Emissions
table b18  
antIgua and barbuda
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 CO2(1985) 1.333 1.294 0.098
Bahamas 0.384 CO2 (1990) 1.580 1.576 0.128
Barbados 0.187 CO2(1997) 1.541 1.460 0.173
Chile 0 CO2(1998) 1.503 1.528 0.422
St. Lucia 0.151 CO2(2005) 1.604 1.587 0.051
Uruguay 0 GDP per capita 9.305 9.595 0.017
Algeria 0 Trade openness 155.993 128.522 0.004
Malaysia 0 Population 
growth
1.022 1.196 0.023
Thailand 0 Urban pop 33.407 66.812 0.004
Malta 0.278 Industry share 17.705 21.759 0.015
Mauritius 0 Services share 79.049 72.085 0.038
Agriculture 
share
3.246 3.585 0.026
RMSPE 0.041505
table b19  
cuba
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bahamas 0.353 CO2 (1993) 1.001 0.931 0.087
Barbados 0.03 CO2(1996) 0.902 0.912 0.166
Bolivia 0.064 CO2(2000) 0.853 0.871 0.283
Chile 0 CO2(2001) 0.825 0.824 0.195
Colombia 0.124 GDP per capita 8.042 8.979 0.006
Costa Rica 0 Trade openness 30.688 60.418 0.004
Ecuador 0.136 Population growth 0.423 1.444 0.002
Panama 0 Urban pop 74.694 74.396 0.008
Peru 0.14 Industry share 23.802 24.366 0.060
St. Lucia 0 Services share 67.148 66.296 0.122
Uruguay 0.153 Agriculture share 9.050 8.922 0.067
Indonesia 0
Tunisia 0
RMSPE 0.109312
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Causal effects of PetroCaribe on sustainable development 35
table b20  
domInIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 CO2(1980) -0.720 -0.660 0.052
Colombia 0 CO2(1996) 0.030 0.039 0.415
Costa Rica 0 CO2(1997) 0.131 0.131 0.447
Peru 0.024 CO2(2005) 0.509 0.606 0.008
St. Lucia 0.146 GDP per capita 8.393 7.537 0.002
Nigeria 0 Trade openness 108.773 104.428 0.049
Vietnam 0.402 Urban pop 60.793 32.847 0.005
Fiji 0.021 Industry share 19.156 29.422 0.001
Mauritius 0.407 Services share 62.930 54.436 0.016
Agriculture share 17.914 16.142 0.005
RMSPE 0.106419
table b21  
domInIcan rePublIc
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 CO2(1985) 0.117 0.184 0.112
Costa Rica 0 CO2(1995) 0.700 0.641 0.047
Ecuador 0.198 CO2(1996) 0.769 0.738 0.000
Panama 0.143 CO2(2003) 0.875 0.757 0.467
Peru 0 CO2(2004) 0.699 0.745 0.219
Lucia 0.654 GDP per capita 8.053 8.499 0.003
Uruguay 0 Trade openness 76.130 115.872 0.000
Indonesia 0.005 Population 
growth
1.816 1.626 0.026
Urban pop 58.296 38.126 0.023
Industry share 33.438 21.022 0.036
Services share 57.073 68.696 0.000
Agriculture 
share
9.488 10.321 0.067
RMSPE 0.100072
table b22  
grenada
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.113 CO2(1985) -0.472 -0.345 0.145
Colombia 0 CO2(1995) 0.405 0.353 0.078
Costa Rica 0 CO2(1996) 0.424 0.416 0.209
Ecuador 0 CO2(2005) 0.743 0.746 0.233
Panama 0 CO2(2006) 0.805 0.811 0.305
Peru 0 GDP per capita 8.586 8.086 0.002
St. Lucia 0.293 Trade openness 103.502 113.318 0.003
Uruguay 0 Population growth 0.220 1.248 0.001
Algeria 0 Urban pop 34.663 37.549 0.011
Tunisia 0 Industry share 20.566 27.526 0.002
Vietnam 0.131 Services share 71.115 60.914 0.002
Mauritius 0.463 Agriculture share 8.319 11.560 0.010
RMSPE 0.093669
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table b23  
guyana
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 CO2 0.657 0.635 0.700
Colombia 0 GDP per capita 7.689 8.179 0.016
Costa Rica 0 Trade openness 206.318 87.880 0.101
Ecuador 0 Population growth 28.881 45.019 0.034
Peru 0 Urban pop 0.141 1.667 0.021
St. Lucia 0.35 Industry share 29.310 35.880 0.021
Algeria 0.407 Services share 36.065 52.959 0.073
Philippines 0.237 Agriculture share 34.624 11.161 0.033
Tunisia 0.006
RMSPE 0.093529
table b24  
JamaIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 CO2(1990) 1.148 1.142 0.223
Bahamas 0.375 CO2(1996) 1.352 1.363 0.136
Barbados 0.045 CO2(1997) 1.386 1.290 0.070
Chile 0.01 CO2(2003) 1.402 1.367 0.189
Colombia 0 CO2(2004) 1.399 1.441 0.111
Ecuador 0 GDP per capita 8.477 8.911 0.003
Panama 0 Trade openness 99.956 92.983 0.011
St. Lucia 0 Population growth 0.778 1.302 0.003
Uruguay 0 Urban pop 51.077 52.317 0.023
Algeria 0.061 Industry share 29.547 29.336 0.085
Indonesia 0 Services share 62.983 63.183 0.138
Thailand 0.509 Agriculture share 7.469 6.870 0.010
Jordan 0
Mauritius 0
RMSPE 0.041067
table b25  
nIcaragua
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Guatemala 0.593 CO2(1991) -0.748 -0.747 0.120
Paraguay 0.11 CO2(1997) -0.421 -0.408 0.154
Angola 0 CO2(2006) -0.199 -0.195 0.325
Nigeria 0 GDP per capita 7.125 7.557 0.012
Papua N.G. 0 Trade openness 61.090 68.072 0.053
Philippines 0.081 Population growth 1.727 2.315 0.033
Vietnam 0.086 Urban pop 54.376 43.836 0.050
Ghana 0.13 Industry share 23.173 30.318 0.000
Services share 56.674 50.553 0.070
Agriculture share 20.153 19.129 0.184
RMSPE 0.036404
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Electricity Use Per Capita
table b26  
St. KIttS and nevIS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 CO2(1990) 1.116 1.207 0.318
Bahamas 0.212 CO2(1997) 1.368 1.289 0.252
Barbados 0.367 CO2(1998) 1.418 1.374 0.000
Chile 0 CO2(2006) 1.550 1.501 0.162
St. Lucia 0.114 CO2(2007) 1.598 1.511 0.000
Malaysia 0.138 GDP per capita 9.344 9.217 0.036
Thailand 0.168 Trade openness 94.382 109.682 0.033
Tunisia 0 Population growth 1.181 1.117 0.045
Mauritius 0 Urban pop 33.122 46.231 0.035
Industry share 26.797 23.490 0.028
Services share 70.365 65.791 0.076
Agriculture share 2.838 5.526 0.014
RMSPE 0.059623
table b27  
St. vIncent and the grenadIneS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 CO2(1985) -0.459 -0.315 0.249
Colombia 0 CO2(1995) 0.171 0.224 0.103
Costa Rica 0 CO2(1996) 0.200 0.305 0.250
Panama 0 CO2(2003) 0.603 0.538 0.186
Peru 0 CO2(2004) 0.706 0.564 0.093
Lucia 0.682 GDP per capita 8.297 7.887 0.022
Uruguay 0 Trade openness 105.454 117.271 0.000
Indonesia 0 Population growth 0.228 1.474 0.003
Tunisia 0 Urban pop 43.000 26.245 0.013
Vietnam 0.318 Industry share 20.182 22.440 0.011
Services share 70.207 63.055 0.051
Agriculture share 9.611 14.505 0.019
RMSPE 0.118302
table b28  
antIgua and barbuda
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 Elec use(1980) 6.564 6.680 0.003
Barbados 0.281 Elec use(1992) 7.098 7.103 0.433
Chile 0.251 Elec use(1993) 7.076 7.147 0.214
Colombia 0 Elec use(2004) 7.726 7.669 0.109
Costa Rica 0 Elec use(2005) 7.773 7.706 0.194
Panama 0.306 GDP per capita 9.182 8.817 0.003
Uruguay 0 Pop density 170.796 249.666 0.013
Malaysia 0 Inflation(99-05) 1.689 2.350 0.001
Thailand 0.06 Urban pop 33.671 54.391 0.005
Turkey 0 Industry share 17.705 25.521 0.014
Mauritius 0.103 Services share 79.049 64.713 0.005
Access Elec 86.550 91.279 0.006
RMSPE 0.211588
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table b29  
cuba
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 Elec use(1993) 6.759 6.753 0.368
Costa Rica 0.487 Elec use(1996) 6.816 6.818 0.184
Ecuador 0.186 Elec use(1997) 6.906 6.873 0.000
Panama 0 Elec use(2001) 6.978 7.016 0.279
Paraguay 0 GDP per capita 8.042 8.339 0.008
Peru 0 Pop density 102.459 63.171 0.095
Tunisia 0.327 Urban pop 74.694 58.749 0.005
Industry share 23.802 29.320 0.024
Services share 67.148 56.539 0.000
Access Elec 95.577 94.984 0.036
RMSPE 0.03333
table b30  
domInIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 Elec use(1985) 5.714 5.917 0.000
Ecuador 0 Elec use(1995) 6.352 6.358 0.000
Paraguay 0 Elec use(1996) 6.308 6.410 0.606
Peru 0.496 Elec use(2004) 6.912 6.841 0.000
Lucia 0.321 Elec use(2005) 6.947 6.884 0.110
Vietnam 0.183 GDP per capita 8.489 7.937 0.000
Urban pop 63.442 48.260 0.051
Pop density 94.671 127.326 0.000
Industry share 19.156 27.620 0.053
Services share 62.930 60.537 0.165
Access Elec 76.944 77.971 0.013
Inflation(97-05) 1.386 3.307 0.002
RMSPE 0.166291
table b31  
domInIcan rePublIc
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 Elec use(1980) 6.065 6.030 0.047
Colombia 0 Elec use(1996) 6.372 6.477 0.129
Ecuador 0.102 Elec use(1997) 6.377 6.530 0.000
Panama 0 Elec use(2003) 6.933 6.829 0.267
Paraguay 0.035 Elec use(2004) 6.779 6.882 0.130
Peru 0.371 GDP per capita 8.013 8.069 0.035
Philippines 0.061 Pop density 154.453 200.285 0.035
Tunisia 0.116 Urban pop 57.183 56.347 0.062
Fiji 0 Industry share 33.438 31.561 0.065
Mauritius 0.315 Services share 57.073 57.193 0.138
Access Elec 85.507 84.325 0.074
Inflation(97-04) 15.042 7.696 0.019
RMSPE 0.232526
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table b32  
grenada
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 Elec use(1985) 5.439 5.578 0.278
Ecuador 0 Elec use(1994) 6.403 6.486 0.364
Paraguay 0 Elec use(1995) 6.694 6.539 0.000
Peru 0 Elec use(2005) 7.151 7.242 0.000
Lucia 0.403 Elec use(2006) 7.289 7.306 0.047
Thailand 0 GDP per capita 8.586 8.069 0.000
Mauritius 0.319 Urban pop 34.663 30.773 0.064
Bhutan 0.278 Pop density 294.617 278.542 0.018
Industry share 20.566 26.722 0.026
Services share 71.115 59.182 0.044
Access Elec 80.865 74.196 0.142
Inflation(97-06) 2.033 3.627 0.017
RMSPE 0.188041
table b33  
guyana
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0 Elec use(1980) 6.240 5.938 0.253
Ecuador 0 Elec use(1996) 6.487 6.276 0.026
Guatemala 0 Elec use(1997) 6.671 6.299 0.166
Paraguay 0.052 Elec use(2005) 6.192 6.302 0.095
Peru 0 Elec use(2006) 6.262 6.392 0.097
Indonesia 0 GDP per capita 7.593 7.357 0.040
Papua N.G. 0 Urban pop 29.325 49.498 0.013
Philippines 0 Pop density 3.856 59.912 0.012
Tunisia 0.495 Industry share 29.310 28.718 0.057
Vietnam 0 Services share 36.065 45.216 0.049
Ghana 0.453 Access Elec 74.304 69.112 0.190
Inflation(97–06) 5.395 10.687 0.001
RMSPE 0.46148
table b34  
JamaIca
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Argentina 0 Elec use(1980) 6.542 6.707 0.020
Chile 0.489 Elec use(1996) 7.576 7.433 0.117
Colombia 0 Elec use(1997) 7.606 7.508 0.289
Costa Rica 0 Elec use(2003) 7.718 7.707 0.184
Panama 0 Elec use(2004) 7.712 7.745 0.306
Paraguay 0 GDP per capita 8.379 8.823 0.005
Peru 0 Pop density 228.246 44.578 0.008
St. Lucia 0.124 Urban pop 49.936 79.108 0.004
Uruguay 0.386 Industry share 29.547 30.968 0.023
Thailand 0 Services share 62.983 61.101 0.032
Tunisia 0 Access Elec 82.067 95.320 0.003
Jordan 0 Inflation(97-04) 8.804 6.253 0.009
Mauritius 0
RMSPE 0.299902
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Manchester School40
table b35  
nIcaragua
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Bolivia 0.594 Elec use 5.745 5.763 0.849
Guatemala 0.213 GDP per capita 7.120 7.382 0.008
Indonesia 0 Urban pop 54.256 53.176 0.043
Nigeria 0.063 Pop density 40.209 45.270 0.013
Philippines 0 Industry share 23.173 30.801 0.015
Ghana 0.131 Services share 56.674 49.624 0.000
Access Elec 71.465 62.131 0.035
Inflation(97-06) 8.560 7.123 0.037
RMSPE 0.084705
table b36  
St. KIttS and nevIS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Barbados 0.397 Elec use(1990) 7.237 7.168 0.045
Chile 0.047 Elec use(1997) 7.497 7.501 0.364
Costa Rica 0 Elec use(1998) 7.510 7.533 0.038
Ecuador 0 Elec use(2006) 7.783 7.826 0.353
Panama 0 Elec use(2007) 7.984 7.870 0.156
Paraguay 0 GDP per capita 9.344 9.134 0.009
Peru 0 Urban pop 33.122 54.033 0.009
Lucia 0.142 Pop density 172.556 300.478 0.016
Uruguay 0.331 Industry share 26.797 22.732 0.002
Thailand 0.083 Services share 70.365 65.710 0.004
Mauritius 0 Access Elec 92.039 95.612 0.001
Inflation(97-07) 3.920 5.210 0.003
RMSPE 0.148472
table b37  
St.vIncent and the grenadIneS
Country weights Covariates Treated Synthetic Weights V
Colombia 0 Elec use(1980) 5.483 5.531 0.406
Ecuador 0.117 Elec use(1996) 6.443 6.426 0.404
Paraguay 0.125 Elec use(1997) 6.484 6.541 0.090
Peru 0 Elec use(2003) 6.785 6.723 0.000
Philippines 0 Elec use(2004) 6.826 6.755 0.032
Tunisia 0.274 GDP per capita 8.201 7.719 0.000
Fiji 0.3 Urban pop 41.791 45.199 0.026
Bhutan 0.184 Pop density 272.871 35.516 0.002
Industry share 20.182 29.692 0.007
Services share 70.207 51.248 0.000
Access Elec 75.805 71.354 0.030
Inflation(97-04) 1.211 7.245 0.002
RMSPE 0.072729
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a P P e n dI x c:  d e S c r I P t I v e Stat I S t I c S
table c1  
deScrIPtIve StatIStIcS gdP
Country Average Std Min Max N
Antigua and 
Barbuda
19865.90 2495.38 17153.70 26007.80 25
Cuba 13501.84 3699.51 9021.20 19950.30 24
Dominica 8556.77 1287.31 6729.34 10435.70 25
Dominican 
Republic
8445.86 2246.63 5213.79 12639.00 25
Grenada 9775.37 1756.52 7284.01 12117.20 25
Guyana 4820.43 1030.52 2928.07 6886.96 25
Haiti 1636.90 74.74 1502.03 1754.10 19
Jamaica 8319.73 348.05 7403.57 8908.90 25
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
19080.26 2758.21 13958.60 22968.00 25
Nicaragua 3592.78 561.75 2821.91 4707.45 25
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines
8254.38 1731.22 5575.94 10494.00 25
Donor pool
Algeria 11192.38 1534.00 9128.17 13553.90 25
Angola 4719.74 1380.21 3024.92 6955.96 25
Argentina 15642.04 2528.99 10833.50 19742.40 25
Bahamas 23754.97 1574.61 21216.90 26248.90 25
Barbados 14221.61 1311.81 11968.20 16083.20 25
Benin 1653.39 141.39 1452.92 1942.26 25
Bolivia 4688.03 725.17 3707.30 6325.07 25
Chile 15868.11 3654.76 9244.16 21923.40 25
Colombia 9338.00 1553.49 7533.52 12715.10 25
Costa Rica 10717.84 2055.39 7787.08 14266.40 25
Ecuador 8457.53 1087.54 7387.62 10923.00 25
Fiji 6901.12 699.00 5678.91 8348.21 25
Ghana 2564.76 599.47 1919.60 3894.00 25
Guatemala 6125.02 574.44 5159.40 7106.39 25
Indonesia 6797.71 1543.24 4477.31 10031.30 25
St. Lucia 9696.22 915.39 7938.43 11059.00 25
Madagascar 1422.92 76.04 1259.48 1660.73 25
Malaysia 17264.99 3922.58 10451.50 24459.70 25
Mali 896.56 116.59 716.41 1114.77 25
Mauritania 3026.30 343.34 2653.39 3693.54 25
Nepal 1637.56 314.08 1198.44 2278.13 25
Nigeria 3746.85 1065.01 2739.59 5639.45 25
Panama 12196.72 3565.81 7815.68 20059.10 25
Papua New 
Guinea
2036.94 284.25 1606.72 2723.49 25
Paraguay 6588.47 698.32 5807.24 8501.63 25
Peru 7619.61 2010.91 5184.97 11545.50 25
Philippines 4713.42 850.89 3796.61 6654.49 25
Thailand 10721.38 2466.95 6650.69 14976.00 25
Trinidad and 
Tobago
21922.51 8049.97 11976.30 31951.00 25
Tunisia 8127.98 1780.90 5614.94 10782.10 25
Turkey 14383.93 2685.15 10849.10 18992.80 25
Uruguay 13666.06 2880.07 9840.73 19827.70 25
Vietnam 3146.57 1195.86 1501.14 5370.21 25
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table c2  
deScrIPtIve StatIStIcS CO2 Per caPIta
Country Average Std Min Max N
Antigua and 
Barbuda
4.49 1.71 1.24 6.01 34
Cuba 2.83 0.46 2.21 3.48 34
Dominica 1.19 0.51 0.48 2.17 34
Dominican 
Republic
1.8 0.46 1.03 2.41 34
Grenada 1.57 0.7 0.53 2.87 34
Guyana 1.98 0.31 1.38 2.63 34
Haiti 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.25 34
Jamaica 3.28 0.68 1.92 4.33 34
St.Kitts and Nevis 3.42 1.46 1.18 5.19 34
Nicaragua 0.67 0.12 0.36 0.84 34
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
1.3 0.67 0.36 2.85 34
Donor pool
Algeria 3.07 0.35 1.9 3.52 34
Angola 0.77 0.36 0.3 1.47 34
Argentina 3.86 0.41 3.29 4.68 34
Bahamas 7.28 5.69 4.29 37.93 34
Barbados 4.11 0.96 2.54 5.84 34
Bolivia 1.15 0.37 0.59 1.89 34
Chile 3.15 0.99 1.77 4.73 34
Colombia 1.57 0.14 1.28 1.89 34
Costa Rica 1.31 0.33 0.75 1.85 34
Ecuador 2.03 0.36 1.21 2.77 34
Fiji 1.17 0.36 0.59 1.94 34
Ghana 0.32 0.07 0.2 0.55 34
Guatemala 0.68 0.17 0.41 0.95 34
Indonesia 1.23 0.48 0.64 2.41 34
Jordan 3.2 0.38 2.07 3.94 34
St. Lucia 1.72 0.55 0.79 2.29 34
Malaysia 4.88 2.01 2.02 8.02 34
Malta 5.58 1.08 3.01 7.18 34
Mauritius 1.84 0.92 0.5 3.24 34
Nigeria 0.61 0.17 0.3 0.92 34
Panama 1.79 0.48 1.04 2.74 34
Papua New Guinea 0.6 0.12 0.43 0.95 34
Paraguay 0.64 0.15 0.4 0.88 34
Peru 1.23 0.29 0.89 1.96 34
Philippines 0.79 0.13 0.51 1 34
Thailand 2.56 1.28 0.76 4.54 34
Tunisia 1.95 0.35 1.41 2.62 34
Turkey 3.04 0.77 1.72 4.4 34
Uruguay 1.67 0.39 1.04 2.55 34
Vietnam 0.76 0.51 0.27 1.84 34
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table c3  
deScrIPtIve StatIStIcS hdI
Country Average Std Min Max N
Cuba 0.714 0.050 0.652 0.784 25
Dominican Republic 0.662 0.037 0.596 0.718 25
Guyana 0.602 0.029 0.537 0.638 25
Jamaica 0.694 0.026 0.651 0.729 25
Nicaragua 0.573 0.048 0.495 0.642 25
Haiti 0.446 0.026 0.405 0.49 25
Donor pool
Argentina 0.771 0.037 0.705 0.826 25
Barbados 0.754 0.027 0.714 0.794 25
Benin 0.412 0.042 0.345 0.481 25
Bolivia 0.608 0.040 0.535 0.671 25
Brunei 0.825 0.024 0.782 0.864 25
Chile 0.773 0.045 0.700 0.845 25
Colombia 0.660 0.038 0.592 0.724 25
Costa Rica 0.715 0.036 0.653 0.775 25
Ecuador 0.684 0.027 0.643 0.739 25
Fiji 0.688 0.024 0.641 0.734 25
Ghana 0.505 0.040 0.455 0.576 25
Guatemala 0.555 0.047 0.478 0.637 25
Indonesia 0.611 0.049 0.528 0.686 25
Malaysia 0.723 0.043 0.643 0.787 25
Mali 0.323 0.070 0.222 0.438 25
Mauritania 0.450 0.038 0.378 0.513 25
Nepal 0.462 0.055 0.378 0.555 25
Panama 0.726 0.036 0.662 0.785 25
Papua New Guinea 0.439 0.047 0.360 0.515 25
Paraguay 0.636 0.033 0.580 0.692 25
Peru 0.678 0.039 0.613 0.737 25
Philippines 0.631 0.031 0.586 0.679 25
Thailand 0.662 0.052 0.574 0.738 25
Trinidad and Tobago 0.727 0.041 0.670 0.779 25
Tunisia 0.659 0.051 0.569 0.723 25
Turkey 0.666 0.061 0.576 0.764 25
Uruguay 0.746 0.032 0.692 0.794 25
Vietnam 0.588 0.063 0.477 0.678 25
Donor pool Haiti
Benin 0.429 0.0330 0.375 0.481 19
Cameroon 0.464 0.027 0.433 0.514 19
Lesotho 0.458 0.019 0.437 0.495 19
Mali 0.350 0.057 0.261 0.438 19
Mauritania 0.466 0.026 0.429 0.513 19
Niger 0.290 0.037 0.237 0.351 19
Papua New Guinea 0.457 0.037 0.406 0.515 19
Senegal 0.423 0.039 0.372 0.491 19
Sudan 0.432 0.037 0.373 0.488 19
Tanzania 0.444 0.053 0.369 0.519 19
Uganda 0.430 0.047 0.336 0.488 19
Zimbabwe 0.441 0.031 0.406 0.507 19
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table c4  
deScrIPtIve StatIStIcS electrIcIty uSe
Country Average Std
Antigua and Barbuda 7.30 0.48
Cuba 6.98 0.12
Dominica 6.34 0.69
Dominican Republic 6.47 0.45
Grenada 6.54 0.73
Guyana 6.17 0.59
Haiti 3.66 0.37
Jamaica 7.08 0.50
St. Kitts and Nevis 7.37 0.55
Nicaragua 5.82 0.24
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 6.41 0.52
Donor pool
Algeria 6.37 0.35
Angola 4.58 0.38
Argentina 7.45 0.30
Bahamas 8.33 0.19
Barbados 7.66 0.40
Bolivia 5.86 0.35
Chile 7.53 0.49
Colombia 6.75 0.15
Costa Rica 7.18 0.28
Ecuador 6.41 0.39
Fiji 6.48 0.22
Ghana 5.69 0.25
Guatemala 5.73 0.41
Indonesia 5.62 0.64
Jordan 6.95 0.45
Lucia 6.95 0.56
Malaysia 7.50 0.59
Malta 8.06 0.38
Mauritius 6.82 0.57
Nigeria 4.50 0.25
Panama 7.04 0.26
Papua New Guinea 5.94 0.14
Paraguay 6.46 0.48
Peru 6.51 0.29
Philippines 6.04 0.27
Thailand 6.88 0.68
Trinidad and Tobago 8.10 0.40
Tunisia 6.59 0.41
Turkey 7.10 0.53
Uruguay 7.40 0.35
Vietnam 5.38 1.02
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fIg. D3. Placebo test Electricity use per capita
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a P P e n d I x e:  le av e o n e o u t
fIg. E1. Leave-one out GDP per capita
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fIg. E3. Leave-one out CO2 per capita
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fIg. F1. Ratios GDP Per Capita
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fIg. F3. Ratios CO2 Per Capita Emissions
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table g1  
SourceS
Variable Description Source
GDP per capita 
(PPP,2011 USD)
GDP per capita, purchasing power parity 
(constant 2011 international $)
GDP per capita (2010, 
USD)
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of GDP
Industry share Industry, value added (%of GDP)
Services share Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)
Agriculture share Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators, 2016
Primary education Gross enrollment ratio for primary school
Secondary education Gross enrollment ratio for secondary 
school
Internet access Individuals using the Internet (% of 
population)
Urban population Urban population (% of total)
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Carbon dioxide 
emissions
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
Population growth Annual population growth rate.
Access electricity Percentage of population with access to 
electricity
Human Development 
Index
Summary measure of average achieve-
ment in key dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable and have a decent 
standard of living
United Nations 
Development 
Programme
Electricity consump-
tion per capita
Total electric power consumption = total 
net electricity generation + electricity 
imports—electricity exports—electricity 
transmission and losses (EIA) by 
population (WDI). Excludes energy 
consumed by generating units
International Energy 
Statistics (EIA)
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